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NOTE
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX:
A STUDY OF U.S. V. SCHIFF AND ITS SISTER CASES
Mia R. Yugo†
DUKE OF VENICE:
That thou shalt see the difference of our spirit,
I pardon thee thy life before thou ask it.
For half thy wealth, it is Antonio’s.
The other half comes to the general state,
Which humbleness may drive unto a fine.
PORTIA:
Ay, for the state, not for Antonio.
SHYLOCK:
Nay, take my life and all. Pardon not that.
You take my house when you do take the prop
That doth sustain my house. You take my life
When you do take the means whereby I live.1
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shakespeare’s Shylock poses an intriguing question: At what point does
the confiscation of wealth infringe upon one’s liberty? Given Shylock’s
predicament, the Duke’s offer of pardon appears to be the pinnacle of
generosity, but Shylock refutes it as a pretext, equating the seizure of goods
and property to an infringement on personal liberty.2 For Shylock, the
appropriation of money is merely another means of achieving the same end:
the confiscation of life and liberty. The right to life, in other words, is

† Articles and Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2016). Ms. Yugo would like to thank Mr.
Charles Helm, J.D., her co-counsel at the National Tax Moot Court Competition, where they
won Second Place, for his engaging discussions during the development of this Note.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act IV, sc. 1, 360-70.
2. In modern English, the line can be translated as:“You take my house away when you
take the money I need for upkeep. You take my life when you take away my means of
making a living.”
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intricately woven with economic freedom. Without the right to earn a living
and benefit from one’s labor, the individual becomes a serf.
That principle was Irwin A. Schiff’s credo in his lifelong battle against the
income tax.3 He argued that the individual income tax, as implemented in
its current form, is an encroachment on economic freedom and thus an
infringement on the right to life. According to Schiff, the “omnipotent
state,” sometimes referred to as the welfare state, is the “antithesis of
liberty.”4
In United States v. Schiff, Schiff was sanctioned for what the courts have
described as “frivolous appeals . . . ‘to make public his radical views on tax
reform.’”5 The “grandfather of the tax protester movement”6 challenged the
validity of the federal income tax, asserting that a tax on individual income
is unconstitutional. The court disagreed. Yet, Schiff views the court’s use
and interpretation of case law regarding the validity of the federal income
tax a product of an “ill placed” reliance on constitutional misapplications.7
Drawing upon Supreme Court precedent and legislative intent, Schiff paints
a portrait of the judiciary’s role in what he views as an illegal tax regime.
Schiff’s legal argument is fourfold: (1) the federal income tax is “not
[directly] ‘traceable’” to the original taxing powers granted by the
Constitution;8 (2) the Sixteenth Amendment “did not amend the
Constitution, nor did its passage give the government any new taxing
power;”9 (3) the absence of a statute precludes liability for income taxes;10

3. Mr. Schiff passed away in federal prison on October 16th 2015, at the age of 87,
while this Note was near completion, in the final stages of editing. See Peter J. Reilly, Irwin
Schiff Famed Tax Protester Dies in Prison, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2015, 10:21 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/10/17/irwin-schiff-famed-tax-protester-diesin-prison/#a9b4c4426b34.
4. IRWIN A. SCHIFF, THE BIGGEST CON: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS FLEECING YOU 313
(Freedom Books 1977).
5. Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Schiff v. Comm’r,
751 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1984)).
6. Peter J. Reilly, Euro Pacific Capital’s Peter Schiff Defends His Tax Protesting Father
Irwin
Schiff,
FORBES
(Dec.
15,
2013,
12:57
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2013/
12/15/euro-pacific-capitals-peter-schiffdefends-his-tax-protesting-father-irwin-schiff/.
7. Irwin A. Schiff, Uncontroverted Fundamental Jurisdictional Challenges Violate
Burden
of
Proof
Requirements
and
Constitutional
Due
Process,
7,
http://www.takelifeback.com/irwin/ appealsup/SCOTUS/IssPres.pdf. This draft petition for
certiorari written by Schiff explains his position on the income tax, offering a legal analysis of
the law with reference to both case and constitutional law.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id.
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and (4) the term “income” in Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code refers
to “income in its ‘Constitutional’ sense” not its “ordinary sense.”11
According to Schiff, since the federal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, his conviction should have been reversed and immediate
release effectuated.12
This Note is a four-part legal analysis of Schiff v. United States and its
sister cases. Section I is an introduction to Schiff. Section II is a background
section that lays the factual foundation for Schiff’s protestation of the
income tax, including procedural history and the origins of the tax: from
judicial interpretation in case law up until the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment. Section III analyzes the validity of the current taxation system,
applying the object and scope limitations laid out in the background section
to the individual income tax in its current form. With Schiff v. United States
as its backdrop, this Note traces Congress’s power of taxation to the original
taxing powers and analyzes the passage, purpose, and actual operation of
the Sixteenth Amendment. Under that framework, the Note assesses
whether the individual income tax, in its current form, is a means to an
improper end, that is, whether it is prohibited by either the Constitution or
natural law theory. Finally, the Note concludes with a brief look into the
First Amendment implications surrounding Schiff’s cases, and then posits a
possible taxation alternative for what many Americans perceive as “the
worst tax—that is, the least fair.”13
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
1. Tax Evasion
Following an assessment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Service for “income tax deficiencies for the years 1974 and 1975,” Schiff was
convicted of failure to pay estimated income tax and fraudulent
underpayment.14 Schiff appealed the decision of the United States Tax
10. Id. at 5-6.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Lawrence E. Zelenak, Foreward: The Fabulous Invalid Nears 100, 73 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. i (2010) (quoting Karlyn Bowman, American Enterprise Institute, Public Opinion on
Taxes 7–8 (2009)) (summarizing the results of ORC and Gallup polls asking respondents to
choose from among four taxes: federal income tax, state income tax, state sales tax, and local
property tax)).
14. Schiff v. C.I.R., 751 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Court on three bases: (1) “he could not be penalized for fraudulent
underpayment of taxes when he, in fact, made no payment,” (2) “the tax on
wage income is unconstitutional,” and (3) “the Commissioner is not
authorized to assess a deficiency if no return was filed.”15 The Second
Circuit denied the appeal, reasoning that the appellant’s arguments were
“wholly lacking in merit” and “without any logical basis.”16 The court
granted the Commissioner’s request for sanctions, awarding both damages
and double costs.17
The prosecutions against Schiff for tax evasion and his subsequent
appeals span nearly four decades. In 1977, only two years after the first set
of sanctions, Schiff once again “filed no tax returns at all for the years 1977
and 1978.”18 Schiff was convicted of failure to pay income taxes from 1976
through 1978, and again appealed the conviction.19 Interestingly, in 1977,
Schiff “file[d] a form 1040 . . . for the year 1976,” setting forth his name,
address, and social security number.20 That form, however, did not set forth
“any financial information in the relevant portions of the return” but
instead asserted in the margins the following contention:
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS RETURN NOR THE LAWS
THAT MAY APPLY TO ME. THIS MEANS THAT I TAKE
SPECIFIC OBJECTION UNDER THE 4th or 5th
AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO THE
SPECIFIC QUESTION.21
Schiff’s objections continued on page two of the form, reasserting his
belief that the federal income tax is voluntary and that there is no criminal
statute making one liable for failure to pay federal income taxes.22 As
recently as 2004, Schiff persistently maintained that “no law requires you to
file income tax returns or pay this tax,” and “there are no criminal statutes
that apply to income taxes . . . [a]nd there is no law giving federal courts
authorization . . . to prosecute anyone for income tax ‘crimes.’”23 The Ninth

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 630 (9th Cir. 2004).
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and Second Circuits have dismissed these claims as “far-fetched”24 and
“frivolous.”25
a. A Dismissal of Merits
The Second Circuit rejected Schiff’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s
holding that Schiff’s “failure to file tax returns for the years 1976 through
1978 was a fraudulent attempt to evade taxes.”26 The court reasoned that a
1040 tax return, which “set forth no financial information,” is “treated as if
no return was filed.”27 The court further found all of Schiff’s contentions to
be “completely lacking in merit.”28
First, the court dismissed Schiff’s argument that the income tax violates
the original taxing powers granted by the Constitution.29 In so holding, the
court relied in part upon Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., which held that
such arguments are “wholly without foundation,” since it is the “command
of the [Sixteenth] Amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to
apportionment.”30
Second, the court reasoned that—contrary to Schiff’s contention—tax
assessments do not amount to a “taking of property without due process.”31
Third, the court held that the IRS “gave timely notice to Schiff” of a tax
deficiency and that “when a taxpayer does not file a tax return, it is as if he
filed a return showing a zero amount for purposes of assessing a
deficiency.”32 Since assessments for zero returns may be filed at any time,
the three-year statute of limitations for assessments did not apply.33
b. Sanctions Revisited
Zeroing in on Schiff’s unwavering opposition to Congress’s authority to
impose a non-apportioned direct tax, the court held that Schiff’s
contentions merited the further imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 38
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.34 In justification, the court

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Schiff, 919 F.2d at 831-33.
Id. at 833.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916).
Schiff, 919 F.2d at 832.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
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highlighted Schiff’s history of “attacks on the tax system.”35 Citing to Schiff’s
previous tax evasion case, the judiciary reaffirmed its description of the
appellant as “an extremist who reserve[s] the right to interpret the decisions
of the Supreme Court as he read[s] them from his layman's point of view
regardless of and oblivious to the interpretations of the judiciary.”36 Finding
a “clear showing of bad faith,” the court once again ordered double costs
and damages “to be paid to the United States.”37 The court further ordered a
prohibition on any further filings to the clerk from the appellant until
payment of the sanctions.38 The court concluded its rather short analysis of
the merits with a mere reassertion of its previously stated contention that
“‘[t]he payment of income taxes is not optional . . . and the average citizen
knows that the payment of income taxes is legally required.’”39
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the sanctions did not have the
deterrent effect the court intended. Rather than withdraw from what the
courts have repeatedly dismissed as ill-placed convictions, Schiff pressed on.
Not only did he continue his zero returns, he also penned books explicating
those views—eventually becoming the grandfather of a movement.40
2. First Amendment Restrictions
Despite repeated incarceration, Schiff remained firm in his convictions.
Most recently, in United States v. Schiff, the Ninth Circuit noted that Schiff
has maintained consistent opposition to the federal income tax for “over
thirty years.”41 The court held that Schiff’s belief in the “voluntary” nature of
the income tax—also outlined in his book, The Federal Mafia—is
“fraudulent commercial speech” not protected by the First Amendment.42
Because Schiff’s speech “organize[d], market[ed], or promote[d] [a] tax
evasion scheme,”43 the court held that the prohibition on the sale and
promotion of such material was properly restricted and consistent with the
First Amendment. The court reasoned that the advertisement of a “tax
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1979)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 835.
39. Id. at 834.
40. See Reilly, supra note 6.
41. United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally Schiff, 919
F.2d at 834; United States. v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986); Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d
460 (8th Cir. 1985); Schiff v. Comm’r, 751 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Schiff,
647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
42. Schiff, 379 F.3d at 629.
43. Id. at 624.
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avoidance scheme” demonstrates a strong likelihood of future violations of
the Internal Revenue Code.44 Furthermore, the court viewed the
perpetuation of this scheme as a serious threat to the validity of the federal
income tax due to “consumer confusion.”45 In balancing Schiff’s First
Amendment interest against the state’s interest in reducing tax avoidance,
the court found in favor of the state, reasoning that his commercial speech
was rightly limited because it was deemed fraudulent.46
B. Origins of the Income Tax
1. “Income” Defined
All U.S. citizens, residents and nonresidents, must pay individual income
tax on their taxable income,47 which is defined as “gross income minus
deductions . . . .”48 Under Cook v. Tait, Congress has power to impose taxes
upon income received by “native citizen[s] of the United States” who were
domiciled in a foreign country “at the time the income was received.”49 The
reach of Section 61 not only stretches beyond the nation’s borders, but also
applies to noncitizens within its borders. Nonresident aliens “engaged or
considered to be engaged in a trade or business in the United States during
the year” must file an income tax return.50 The nonresident alien must
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 630.
Id.
I.R.C. § 1 (2015).
I.R.C. § 62. I.R.C. § 61 defines “gross income” as:
[A]ll income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived from business; (3)
Gains derived from dealings in property; (4) Interest; (5) Rents; (6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends; (8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments; (9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts; (11) Pensions; (12)
Income from discharge of indebtedness; (13) Distributive share of partnership
gross income; (14) Income in respect of a decedent; and (15) Income from an
interest in an estate or trust.
I.R.C. § 61. All income derived from these sources is taxable income. Some items, however,
such as income acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance or proceeds from life
insurance contracts paid by reason of the death of the insured are, for policy reasons,
specifically excluded from gross income. See generally I.R.C. §§ 101-139A.
49. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54 (1924).
50. See IRS, Taxation of Nonresident Aliens, (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/
Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Taxation-of-Nonresident-Aliens. A nonresident alien is
defined as “an alien who has not passed the green card test or the substantial presence test.”
Id.
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report all income “effectively connected” with their trade or business and all
“U.S. source income that is ‘fixed, determinable, annual, or periodical
(FDAP).’”51
Under the current federal taxation system, all income derived from the
non-exhaustive list of fifteen sources listed in Section 61 of the I.R.S. Code
is taxed at a progressive rate. For single persons earning between $0 and
$9,225, the 2015 marginal income tax rate is 10%.52 For persons earning
between $37,450 and $90,750, the rate is 25%.53 For persons earning
$413,200 and over, the rate is 39.6%.54 The higher the value of the property
acquired, the higher the rate of taxation.
Failure to pay results in either “failure-to-file” or “failure-to-pay”
penalties.55 Although “reasonable cause” may, in some circumstances,
excuse persons from penalties, “willful neglect” on the part of the taxpayer is
punished to the fullest extent of the law.56 In some cases, the consequence of
willful neglect is incarceration.
The existence of this system, in its current form, is not in dispute. Schiff
does not question its existence, but rather its faithfulness to its original
purpose. Two issues lie at the heart of America’s individual income tax
system: (1) What is the basis for the government’s power to tax individual
income? and (2) Does the current system of taxation comport with the
spirit of the law, as envisioned by the Founders?
2. Original Taxing Powers
a. Schiff’s First Argument: Traceability
Schiff’s first argument is that the individual income tax is “not [directly]
traceable” to the original taxing powers granted to Congress by the
Constitution.57 The Constitution contains three original clauses pertaining
to taxation. Article I, Section 8 grants the federal government the power to
“lay and collect” taxes.58 This power, however, is limited by two additional
clauses. Article I, Section 2, clause 3 imposes upon Congress the Rule of
51. Id.
52. See Kyle Pomerleau, 2015 Tax Brackets, (Oct. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/2015-tax-brackets.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. IRS, Failure to File or Pay Penalties: Eight Facts, (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Failure-to-File-or-Pay-Penalties:-Eight-Facts.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. See Schiff, supra note 7, at 7.
58. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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Apportionment, mandating that direct taxes must be apportioned among
the several states. Article I, Section 9, clause 4 further dictates that no direct
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration.59 Hence,
any non-apportioned, direct tax is unconstitutional.
By contrast, indirect taxes, including duties, imposts, and excises, must
be levied according to “geographic uniformity.”60 Any tax falling under this
class of taxation need not be apportioned among the several states.
The crux of the matter is the proper classification of the individual
income tax. Schiff contends the individual income tax is not imposed as
either a direct or indirect tax.61 “Since the individual income tax is not
imposed pursuant to either class,” he states, “it is not a tax authorized by the
Constitution, and thus cannot be legally enforced by any federal court . . .
.”62 In other words, he argues the income tax is unconstitutional because (a)
it is a direct tax, (b) direct taxes must be apportioned among the states, (c)
the income tax is not apportioned, and therefore, (d) the income tax is
unconstitutional. This, in Schiff’s view, is the limitation imposed on
Congress by the Constitution’s “original taxing powers.” Since the
Constitution does not give Congress authority to impose non-apportioned
direct taxes, the income tax is therefore not “directly traceable” to the
original taxation clauses.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in its 1895 decision in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., which was later vacated, but is essential to
analyze since its reasoning is the basis upon which Schiff and the tax
protester movement rely.
(1) Pollock Introduced: An Unconstitutional Direct Income
Tax
The origins of the federal income tax date back to the formation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in the 19th century. In 1862, “President Lincoln
and Congress . . . created the position of commissioner of Internal Revenue
and enacted an income tax to pay war expenses.”63 However questionable
the legality of this measure at the time, it was enacted as temporary relief for
the war effort. Ten years later, the tax was repealed.64 But the respite was

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
IRS.
64.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4.
Schiff, supra note 7, at 8.
Id.
Id.
IRS, Brief History of IRS, (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Brief-History-ofId.
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brief. In 1894, 22 years after the repeal, Congress “revived the income tax.”65
One year later, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., the Supreme
Court struck down the income tax as unconstitutional.66
The Pollock Court held that the 1894 tax was a “constitutionally
impermissible unapportioned direct tax.”67 The majority held that the
“whole law of 1894 should be declared void and without any binding
force.”68 The Court reasoned that the federal government’s tax on income
from real estate, rents, and profits was outside the power of Congress
because it was “not imposed by the rule of apportionment according to the
representation of the [s]tates, as prescribed by the Constitution.”69 The
Court similarly held that the taxation of bonds and securities of the states
and municipal bodies was “beyond the power of Congress.”70 Since the 1894
income tax was a direct tax not apportioned among the several states
according to population, the tax was declared void. Thus, the original taxing
power of the Constitution limited the right of taxation. Any direct tax levied
in violation of the rule of apportionment was declared unconstitutional:
The inherent and fundamental nature and character of a tax is
that of a contribution to the support of the government, levied
upon the principle of equal and uniform apportionment among
the persons taxed, and any other exaction does not come within
the legal definition of a tax.71
A tax levied upon income but imposed unequally was deemed an
“arbitrary and capricious” exercise of legislative power.72 Hence, the Court
struck down the tax, declaring it a “shackle . . . upon state powers.”73
(2) Pollock Reinterpreted
Contrary to the interpretation of tax protesters, some scholars interpret
Pollock as validating taxation of income from employment.74 In so arguing,

65. Id.
66. Id. See generally Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
67. Zelenak, supra note 13, at iii (citing Pollock, 157 U.S. 429).
68. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607-08.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 608.
71. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 600.
73. Id. at 602.
74. See, e.g., Christopher Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering
Unto Caesar-Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 312 (1996). Jackson states, “In
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these opponents partly rely on Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Pollock,
which states, “[I]t is expressly decided that the term [direct tax] does not
include the tax on income.”75 It is admitted, however, that the precise
meaning of direct taxes, “in the sense of the Constitution” is “a question not
absolutely decided.”76 The dissent expressly acknowledges that “at the very
birth of the government a contention arose as to the meaning of the word
‘direct’” but that the “controversy was determined by the legislative and
executive branches of the government.”77 The dissent then outlines the
construction of the term “direct,” relying on decades of judicial
adjudication to conclude that “direct taxes within the meaning of the
constitution were only taxes on land and capitation taxes.”78 The “long and
settled practice” of construing direct taxation in this manner is, from the
dissent’s viewpoint, unjustly overthrown.79
To declare, as the majority does, that the “vast sums” of money “collected
from the people of the United States” through the income tax were
wrongfully taken renders the government vulnerable to claims for “an
enormous amount of money.”80 The economic repercussions of a
declaration of invalidity were evidently the heart of the dissent’s concern. Its
constitutional interpretation, coincidentally, alleviates that concern. For
critics of the tax protester movement, the Sixteenth Amendment does away
with the concern entirely.
b. Schiff’s Second Argument: Income in its ‘Constitutional’ v.
‘Ordinary’ Sense
Schiff’s second justification for “zero returns” is based on a 1921
Supreme Court decision, Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company v. Smietenka.81
According to Schiff, Merchants’ Loan & Trust provides a crucial distinction
between income in its “constitutional” sense and income in the “ordinary”
sense.82

Pollock, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that taxes on income from one's employment
are not direct taxes and are not subject to apportionment.” Id.
75. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 635 (White, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 636.
78. Id. at 637.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Schiff, supra note 7, at 16 (citing Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietenka, 255
U.S. 509, 520 (1921)).
82. Id. at 17.
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At issue in Merchants’ Loan is the meaning of the word “income” within
the Income Tax Act of 1916.83 The plaintiff, a trustee of property under a
will, challenged the classification of capital assets of an estate as income
under (1) the 1916 Income Tax Act and (2) the Sixteenth Amendment.84
The question posed to the Court was whether the proceeds of the sale of
corporate stock by testamentary trustees was income within the meaning of
the Constitution and subsequently, the Income Tax Act.85
The plaintiff argued that the “appreciation in value of the capital assets of
the estate” did not constitute “income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment.86 The gain or profit at issue, according to the plaintiff, did not
satisfy the requirements of income classification in the constitutional sense.
This was because the income from the proceeds of the sale of the stock were
never received: the widow did not receive it, the children did not receive it,
and the trustee did not receive it.87 Consequently, the plaintiff asserted that
the “increase in value of the stock could not be lawfully taxed under the act
of Congress.”88 Since the appreciation in value was never received, it should
never have been classified as income.89
Two bases were offered in support of the plaintiff’s exclusion of the
increase in value of the stock as income: First, the instrument that created
the trust—a will—required that “stock dividends and accretions of selling
value shall be considered principal and not income.”90 Second, the Supreme
Court already stipulated that the type of gain or profit at issue in Merchant’s
Loan & Trust was not contemplated to be “income” in the constitutional
sense.91 Under Eisner v. Macomber, “the ‘common understanding’ [of] the
term ‘income’ does not comprehend such a gain or profit as we have here,
which it is contended is really an accretion to capital and therefore not
constitutionally taxable . . . .” 92
With regard to the definition of income provided in the will, the Court
disregarded the instrument, reasoning, as a general rule, that “[i]t [is] not

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Merchant’s Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietenka, 255 U.S. 509, 514 (1921)
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514-15.
Id.
Id. at 515 (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)).
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within the power of the testator to render [a] fund non-taxable.”93 With
regard to the meaning of income in its constitutional sense, the Court
turned to precedent and noted that “[t]he question is one of definition and
the answer to it may be found in recent decisions of this [C]ourt.”94
One of the earliest formulations of “income” in its constitutional sense is
found in Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert. There, the Court defined
income as “[a] gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined.”95 This definition, however, was later expanded. As the Court
notes, the term income was defined with more particularity in cases “arising
under” the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 and the Income Tax Acts.96
That definition, according to the Merchants’ Loan Court, is controlling.
The most notable addition came in Eisner v. Macomber where, as noted,
the Court defined “income” as “a gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained
through sale or conversion of capital assets.”97 The Court reasoned that this
definition of income under the Corporation Excise Income Tax Act of 1909
logically carries over to the Tax Act of 1913.98 “There would seem to be no
room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all of the
Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise
Tax Act and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by
decisions of this court.”99
Schiff’s view, therefore, is that the Merchants’ Loan decision made clear
that “[i]ncome in its ‘constitutional sense’ . . . means, ‘income separated
from its source.’”100 If there is no separation, then the “income tax falls
directly on the source (i.e. the property that generated the income),” hence
“qualif[ying] it as a ‘property tax’ rather than an ‘income tax.’”101 The
enforcement of the income tax by federal courts is therefore
unconstitutional, Schiff argues, because any “tax on the income from real
and personal property is unconstitutional and void if not apportioned.”102

93. Id. at 516.
94. Id. at 517.
95. Id. at 517 (quoting Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415 (1913))
(internal quotations omitted).
96. Id. at 518.
97. Id. at 518 (quoting Eisner, 252 U. S. at 207) (internal quotations omitted).
98. Id. at 518-19.
99. Id. at 519.
100. Schiff, supra note 7, at 18.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)).
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Hence, Schiff argues that Howbert, Eisner, and Merchants’ Loan render the
individual income tax unconstitutional by definition.
Unlike Pollock, Merchants’ Loan was decided in 1921, after the passage of
the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus, Schiff argues that when income cannot be
separated from its source, any un-apportioned tax such as today’s
individual income tax is unconstitutional notwithstanding the Sixteenth
Amendment.103
3. The Sixteenth Amendment: Passage and Purpose
a. Passage
In 1909, the Sixteenth Amendment was submitted to the states for
ratification.104 Four years later, on February 25, 1913, the Amendment
passed with more than three-fourths of the necessary support.105 With
Wyoming on board, the three-quarter-majority requirement was satisfied
and the Constitution amended.106 Only four states, Connecticut, Florida,
Rhode Island, and Utah rejected it. 107
The Sixteenth Amendment states: “The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration.”108 When Wyoming finally ratified the Amendment in
1913, its passage, according to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, “gave
Congress the authority to enact an income tax.”109 The original law,
however, is a far cry from today’s Internal Revenue Code.
The original law, as Schiff explains, contained a mere fourteen pages and
“levied a delicate tax of 1 percent, graduated as follows: 2 percent on
$20,000-50,000, 3 percent on $50,000-75,000, 4 percent on $75,000$100,000, 5 percent on $100,000-$250,000, 6 percent on $250,000-$500,000,
and 7 percent thereafter.”110 Its primary purpose, according to the IRS, was
to tax the wealthy in order to “pay war expenses.”111

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 254.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Brief History of IRS, supra note 63.
SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 253.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Brief History of IRS, supra note 63.
SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 254 n.1.
Brief History of IRS, supra note 63.
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b. Purpose
(1) War Expenses
The purpose of the original 1862 income tax was to pay war expenses
during the American Civil War.112 When the war ended, that purpose could
no longer be served. Thus the tax was repealed ten years later—and again
rendered unconstitutional after a revival in 1894.113 The purported purpose
of the 1913 Tax Act, however, is not as clear. Paying war expenses is
certainly one of the purposes served by the tax. In 1918, for example, the top
rate was increased to seventy-seven percent to “help finance the war effort”
during World War I, then dropped to twenty-four percent in 1929, then
rose again during the Great Depression.114 Evidently, a portion of the
revenue raised was indeed used to fund war efforts, but since the tax has
remained in force long after the First World War, paying war expenses may
not have been its chief object. The query, therefore, is whether the purpose
now served by the income tax exceeds the authority granted to Congress.
In 2013, the federal income tax celebrated its 100th birthday. The tax
protester interpretation of Pollock’s holding of a constitutionally
impermissible income tax has been swept aside and the dissent’s opinion
now reigns supreme. The “development of constitutional law” now stands
as the primary justification for the shift from direct taxation as controversy
to direct taxation as settled law.115
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
PART I
A. Reliance on Pollock and Merchants’ Loan
Schiff contends the traceability argument is valid notwithstanding the
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.116 That four-line amendment, which
gave Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, he argues, “did not
automatically abrogate every other line and right secured to Americans by
the same Constitution.”117

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Jackson, supra note 74, at 312.
See generally SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 309.
Id.
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First, Schiff argues that Pollock is still valid law. Notwithstanding the
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Schiff argues Pollock was “never
reversed, never overturned.”118 Hence, its limitation on Congress’ authority
to tax is still in place. Second, Schiff argues that Merchants’ Loan & Trust—
like Pollock—is also valid, as it too was never overturned.119 Both arguments
rest on judicial interpretation. While valid case law is indeed proper legal
authority, judicial interpretation is subject to change. The principle of stare
decisis, for example, does not bar a court from overturning its own decision.
Even if the Supreme Court one day accepts Schiff’s interpretations of both
cases (which has yet to occur), those concessions would not bar the Court
from overturning its own holdings. For this reason, even assuming Schiff’s
reliance on past judicial interpretation is helpful to his case (a position
courts have repeatedly rejected), it is insufficient to render the tax
unconstitutional, particularly when the current judiciary views all
challenges as “frivolous” appeals of settled law.120
Thus, as between his argumets, Schiff’s analysis of the object and
operation of the income tax, in its current form, is his stronger
constitutional argument. That argument is twofold. First, Schiff argues that
if the object of the Sixteenth Amendment exceeds the authority granted by
the People to Congress to enact laws, the tax is unconstitutional.121 Second,
he asserts that even if the object of the Sixteenth Amendment was a
legitimate end within the scope of authority granted to the civil
government, its steady expansion could nonetheless render it
unconstitutional in operation.
PART II
The Sixteenth Amendment: Exceeding the Scope of Authority
Granted by ‘We the People’
118. Schiff, supra note 7, at 17.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1990).
121. See, e.g., SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 253-54. Discussing the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment, Schiff states:
The U.S. electorate was tricked into voting for it because it was presented to
them as a “soak-the-rich” scheme . . . Clearly, therefore, there has been a breach
by the federal government of the taxing powers initially conveyed to it, which
required a constitutional amendment. Since current levels of taxation go far
beyond anything that consenting voters contemplated, there was, in legal
parlance, no ‘meeting of the minds,’ and hence no contract binding the
Sixteenth Amendment to the citizens of this republic can be assumed.
Id.
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A. Object: A Tax on the Wealthy or a Pretext for the Redistribution of
Wealth?
If the actual object of the individual income tax is a redistribution of
wealth, Schiff argues its end is an illegitimate object, falling outside the
jurisdiction of the federal government. According to Schiff, the Sixteenth
Amendment, together with the creation of the Federal Reserve System,
enabled the federal government to first create economic classes and then
shift wealth between them.122 Schiff argues that the Sixteenth Amendment
and Federal Reserve System “gave the federal government the means to
plunder both [American] productivity and . . . savings.”123 By imposing
higher taxes on wealthier individuals, the individual income tax punishes
success. Contrary to a flat tax, the progressive taxation system separates
individuals into classes. By imposing lower rates on lower income earners,
the system in effect favors those who produce less and punishes those whose
productivity earns them a higher income. The IRS calls this a “fair share.”124
Schiff calls it unconstitutional income shifting orchestrated by “too much
government.”125
In short, if the actual purpose of the amendment is to redistribute wealth
(as opposed to, for example, raising money to pay for war expenses), then
Schiff views that purpose as illegitimate and unconstitutional for two
reasons: firstly because he asserts people were “tricked” into voting for it
(thinking it would only affect the rich, which it does not) and secondly,
because that redistribution creates a system of involuntary servitude, thus
violating the Thirteenth Amendment, as explained in the next section.126
This object/purpose argument, as framed by Schiff, inevitably overlaps with
his operation argument because the implementation of the tax system
reveals its purpose.127 Simply put, the theory posits that the actual object of
the system only became visible once it was operational. Thus, once the tax
system was in place, the redistribution of wealth revealed itself as the true
object of the Sixteenth Amendment, which purpose according to Schiff,
violates the Thirteenth Amendment.128

122. Id.
123. Id. at 253.
124. IRS, The Agency, its Mission, and Statutory Authority, (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority.
125. SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 313.
126. Id. at 254.
127. Id. at 309-10.
128. Id.
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B. Operation: The Thirteenth Amendment and Involuntary Servitude
The next argument in the tax protester movement is the belief that the
income tax, in its current form, infringes upon the economic freedom
secured by the Founders. As tax protestors argue, its operation falls outside
the scope of authority granted by the People, and therefore violates the
spirit of the Constitution—if not in object then in operation. It is on this
ground that Schiff argues the Sixteenth Amendment was fraudulently
presented to the American people as a “soak-the-rich scheme.”129
Specifically, he contends the “U.S. electorate was tricked into voting for it,”
believing it would “only affect the wealthy.”130 In support, he refers to
statistics from 1916, detailing that “only 362,970 Americans out of a
population of 102 million paid taxes—or less than 4/10 of one percent.”131
By the late 1970s, that percentage climbed to fifty percent.132 Today, the
income tax affects a large majority of the population. In 2012, for example,
“the IRS collected more than $2.5 trillion in revenue and processed more
than 237 million tax returns.”133 Based on statistics from the 1970s, Schiff
concludes that the income tax, as it operates today, is unconstitutional
because it exceeds the original intent of the Sixteenth Amendment:
[T]here has [clearly] been a breach by the federal government of
the taxing power initially conveyed to it, which required a
constitutional amendment. Since current levels of taxation go far
beyond anything that consenting voters contemplated, there was,
in legal parlance, no “meeting of the minds,” and hence no
contract binding the Sixteenth Amendment to the citizens of this
republic . . . .134
Schiff argues that even if the object of the Sixteenth Amendment was
legitimate, the ‘actual operation’ of the federal income tax now exceeds the
amendment’s original purpose. This absence of a consensus ad item
(“meeting of the minds”) to which Schiff frequently refers can also be
understood as a pretext for an unconstitutional end.
Schiff contends that the “actual operation,” “current tax rates,” and
“manner” in which the Sixteenth Amendment is enforced “attempt[s] to
destroy all the rights which are secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 253. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 253-54 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 254 n.1.
Id.
The Agency, its Mission, and Statutory Authority, supra note 124.
SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 254.
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Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth amendments.”135 Of these, the
prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment against involuntary servitude is
his most attractive legal basis for the unconstitutionality of the income tax
in its current form. Another of Schiff’s constitutional arguments rests on
the prohibition against titles of nobility in Article 1, Section 9, clause 8.136 A
Constitution built on negative rights prohibits the federal government from
enforcing a system of taxation that creates a privileged class of citizens
through a forced distribution of wealth.
Since the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, it prohibits
involuntary servitude between individuals.137 Schiff contends that this
prohibition applies not only between individuals, but “denie[s] such a
relationship to the state as well.”138 At the current rate of taxation, tax
protesters argue that the individual income tax “attempts to reduce all
productive citizens to peons in the service of the state.”139
In short, the first argument asserts that if the actual object of the
Sixteenth Amendment was to shift income from one economic class to
another, that object would be improper because it falls outside the
jurisdiction of the federal government. The second argument asserts that
even if, arguendo, the original object of the Sixteenth Amendment (i.e. to
pay war expenses, to provide financial security for seniors) was indeed
proper, its expansion beyond that object, renders it a means to an
illegitimate end: the redistribution of wealth through involuntary
servitude.140
The Constitution “was primarily established to protect the lives,
property, and privacy of Americans . . . .”141 Forcing higher income earners
to subsidize lower income individuals falls outside the jurisdiction of the
government. On July 4, 1776, the people of the several states formed a
nation built on the unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. The pursuit of happiness, rooted in the right to property,
protects the fruits of one’s labor from being plundered by the state. The
Thirteenth Amendment secures that right by prohibiting the confiscation of
wealth, the product of one’s labor. When the state, in this case, the federal
government, forcibly confiscates a significant percentage of one’s personal
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 310.
Id.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 309.
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income, it creates a de facto state of servitude, a form of slavery. By creating
economic classes, the state enslaves one portion of the population to the
other.142 The private sector is taxed at exorbitant rates while the public
sector reaps the benefits of forced charity—the “antithesis of [personal]
liberty.”143
C. Endowed by the Creator
Another theory favoring tax protesters, albeit not articulated by Schiff, is
natural law theory. This argument espouses that all law comes from God:
“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no
authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been
instituted by God.”144 The Declaration of Independence, for example,
echoes this Biblical worldview, noting that the scope of the government’s
powers is framed by the consent of persons already endowed by God with
certain unalienable rights:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.145
In 1776, the sovereign of the land—the People of the United States—formed
a nation-state by consenting to limited government, instituted among men
to secure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.146 Reflecting the passage
in Romans 13, the purpose of that government was neither to grant nor
infringe upon liberty; the sole purpose, rather, was the security of existing,
unalienable rights already granted by the Creator. Consent is therefore
limited to the government’s proper observance of power; when the
magistrate exceeds its authority, consent is not withdrawn but is absent
altogether.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 313.
144. Romans 13:1 (New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition).
145. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
146. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3 (stating qualifications for Senators, the count of
years which indicate the birth of the nation occurred in 1776, not 1789).
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Recall for example, the principle “lex iniusta non est lex,” meaning “an
unjust law is not a law.”147 Although the precise origins of its wording are
uncertain, the slogan can generally be traced back to a passage from Saint
Augustine on the topic of free will:
A soldier is even ordered by law to kill the enemy, and if he
hangs back from the slaughter, he is punished by his commander.
Shall we dare to say that those laws are unjust—or, rather, no
laws at all? For that which is not just does not seem to me to a be a
law” (“lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non feurit” De libero
arbitrio I v 11).148
The “non est lex” principle is now often associated with the Thomistic
tradition, having been refined by Augustine’s successor, Saint Thomas
Aquinas,149 though perhaps not coined by Aquinas in precisely those
terms.150 Applying the principle to the tax protester movement, the
argument, in theory, is that the consent of the people is limited to laws that
are just, and justice is that which protects the rights granted by the Creator.
For Aquinas, “unjust laws are . . . ‘acts of violence rather than laws.’”151 They
“bind in conscience, if at all, not per se, but only per accidens. They are
laws, not ‘simpliciter,’ or, as we might say, in the ‘focal’ or ‘paradigmatic’
sense, but only in a derivative or secondary sense (‘secundum quid’).”152
Indeed, this relationship between morality and law is the focal point of the
positivists’ attack on natural law theory:
If the positive law is, as all followers of the natural-law doctrine
assert, valid only so far as it corresponds to the natural law, any
norm created by custom or stipulated by a human legislator
which is contrary to the law of nature must be considered null
147. 33 AM. JUR., Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non est Lex – Laws on Trial in
Aquinas’ Court of Conscience 101 (1988).
148. Id. (citing JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 363 (Oxford, The
Clarendon Press) (1980) (commenting on Augustine)).
149. Robert P. George, Kelsen and Aquinas on “The Natural-Law Doctrine,” 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1625, 1640 (2000). George states, “A commonplace criticism of Aquinas is that
his evident endorsement of Saint Augustine's statement that ‘a law that is not just[] seems to
be no law at all’ shows that he is guilty of merging the categories of ‘legal’ and ‘moral . . . .’”
Id.
150. Id. at 101-05.
151. Id. at 1642 (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, q. 96, art. 4
(Fathers of the Eng. Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc. 1947) (1485)
(discussing the ways in which a law is unjust)).
152. Id. at 1642.
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and void. This is the inevitable consequence of the theory which
admits the possibility of positive law as a normative system
inferior to natural law. The extent to which a writer abides by
this consequence is a test of his sincerity. Very few stand this
test.153
Kelsen’s critique here is, as Robert P. George states, a “familiar charge
against natural law theory.”154 It posits that the “lex iniusta non est lex”
principle undermines the fabric of law; to base the validity of law on the
laws of nature would in other words, create instability and uncertainty in
the law—two unsustainable consequences of the natural law approach, at
least as understood [or misunderstood] by the positivists.
In Schiff’s case, positivists would (and have) undoubtedly echoed this
critique, asserting that the individual income tax, in every form, is valid
manmade law, and thus binding despite the breadth of its scope. To think
otherwise would destabilize the state of affairs. But is this a fair attack? Are
such consquences truly attributable to Aquinas’ theory of natural law and
by extension, the natural law approach to the tax system? Not on George’s
account of Aquinas, at least with respect to the former.155 In fact, George
explains that Aquinas’ natural law theory is highly nuanced, and despite
misinterpretations by theorists such as H.L.A. Hart,156 “[n]othing in
Aquinas's legal theory suggests that the injustice of a law renders it
something other than a law (or ‘legally binding’) for purposes of
intrasystemic juristic analysis and argumentation.”157 Aquinas believed
rather, that “human positive law creates a moral duty of obedience,” but he
also believed that because of man’s imperfection, this law is, at times,
unjust.158
Where then, does the Thomistic formulation of natural law leave the tax
protester movement? Assuming the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
was indeed valid, does its expansion now preclude legitimacy under natural
law? For Aquinas, a tyrannical law is “essentially a criminal type of rule;”
unjust acts of tyrants are not only “devoid of moral authority,” but also
“constitute a kind of criminality which can justify revolutionary violence for
153. Id. at 1639 (quoting Hans Kelsen, The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of
Science, W. Pol. Q., Dec. 1949, at 481, 481 reprinted in Hans Kelsen, What is Justice? Justice,
Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen 137, 137 (1957)).
154. Id. at 1639.
155. Id. at 1641.
156. Id. at 1643.
157. Id. at 1642.
158. Id. at 1641.
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the sake of the common good, and even tyrannicide, as a kind of resistance
to, and/or just punishment of, the tyrant.”159 Does this mean that Aquinas
would automatically endorse an upheaval of an “unjust” tax system?
Certainly not. As George explains, Aquinas does not view the right of
revolution as absolute, but he does view tyrannical rule as a “perversion of
law,” which “gives rise to a (prima facie) right of resistance.”160 Applying
this to the tax protester movement, if indeed the current form of the
individual income tax can be deemed a “perversion of law,” natural law
theory, as posited by Aquinas, would impose upon legislators the obligation
to change the tax system through lawful means. As articulated by George:
[W]here legitimate rule has degenerated into tyranny, the tyrants
are entitled to something which we might call ‘due process of
law.’ It is up to other public officials, operating as such, and not
(ordinarily) to private citizens to overthrow their regimes and, if
necessary, bring them personally to trial and punishment . . . .161
Simply put, assuming the income tax is now overly expansive, the
Thomistic tradition would impose upon lawmakers (i.e. Congressmen) the
obligation, under natural law theory, to change whatever manmade law is
deemed “unjust.” This change could be brought about for example, by
lawfully repealing the Sixteenth Amendment and replacing the individual
income tax with a sales tax alternative.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Tax Alternatives: A Sales Tax System
One solution for avoiding the legal problems associated with the
constitutionality debate while also returning America to the guidelines
envisioned by the Founders is to simply repeal the Sixteenth Amendment.
Such repeal would lawfully address the issue of validity presented by
Aquinas without resorting to revolutionary means. Whilst Aquinas permits
the use of force against usurping tyrants,162 a revolutionary right is not

159. Id. at 1643.
160. Id. at 1645 (internal quotations omitted).
161. Id. at 1644.
162. Id. at 1644 (“He suggests that usurping tyrants—as, in effect, parties making war
against the political community—may legitimately be resisted and even killed by anyone
who has the effective power to do so.”).
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absolute,163 and a lawful repeal would therefore be very much in accord with
the duty of public officials to redress legitimate rule that has devolved into
tyranny.164 Assuming Schiff is correct in his formulation of the income tax
as the “antithesis of liberty,”165 legislators would have an obligation under
natural law theory to make new law that comports with eternal law by not
infringing upon individual rights granted by the Creator.
A burdensome income tax that infringes upon the individual’s economic
freedom to such extent as to violate the right to property (i.e. the right to
the fruit of one’s labor) also infringes upon the right to life. Just as
Shakespeare’s Shylock equated the appropriation of wealth with the
infringement on personal liberty, so too did the Founders view excessive
taxation as an infringement on the right to life. Consent to any form of
taxation, whether income or property, was viewed as a necessary protection
against tyranny. The Stamp Act Congress, for example, noted that, “it is
inseparably essential to the freedom of a people . . . that no taxes should be
imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their
representatives.”166 As revolutionary lawyer Silas Downer once noted, the
right to property, and thus to the fruits of one’s labor, was understood in
the Founding era to be inextricably intertwined with the right to life:
For if they can take away one penny from us against our wills,
they can take all. If they have such power over our properties
they must have a proportionable power over our persons; and
from hence it will follow, that they can demand and take away
our lives, whensoever it shall be agreeable to their sovereign wills
and pleasure.167
For Aquinas, there is no doubt that the government has a right to tax, but
the question is how expansive that tax system should be. The rest of the
passage from Romans 13 quoted above ends with an acknowledgement of
the magistrate’s right to tax:

163. Id. at 1645 (“Aquinas does not treat the right of revolution in the face of tyranny as
absolute . . . .”).
164. Id. at 1644.
165. SCHIFF, supra note 4, at 313.
166. Resolutions
of
the
Stamp
Act
Congress,
HISTORYPLACE.COM,
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/revolution/stamp-res.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2015).
167. David Upham, The Primacy of Property Rights and the American Founding, THE
FREEMAN (Feb. 1, 1998), http://fee.org/freeman/the-primacy-of-property-rights-and-theamerican-founding/.
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For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are
God’s servants, busy with this very thing. Pay to all what is due
them—taxes to whom taxes are due, revenue to whom revenue is
due, respect to whom respect is due, honor to whom honor is
due.168
Contrary to popular misinterpretation, natural law theory as postulated by
Aquinas evidently subjects civilians to government rule and imposes upon
them the duty to pay taxes.169 This duty, however, is limited, as the plain
language of the passage itself reveals, to what is “due” to the magistrate.
Assuming the current tax rate is not reflective of what is actually due to the
government, a sales tax substitute would reign in Caesar’s reach by leaving
the federal and state governments with the sole tool of a sales tax to gather
revenue. For transparency, the sales tax could be broken up to show citizens
where their hard-earned money is going. For instance, if the total federal
sales tax is five percent, half a percent could be used for border security,
including the budget for the Armed Forces, one percent for domestic law
enforcement, two percent for infrastructure and so on. Furthermore, if the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 were repealed, the power to coin money would
return to Congress, as outlined in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.170
This alternative tax system, which would also lawfully repeal the property
and estate taxes, would notably decrease state revenues and by extension
greatly reduce the influence of government in citizens’ daily lives. Indeed,
such a regime would allow the federal government to downsize and focus
instead on maintaining infrastructure, the integrity of the nation’s borders,
and upholding contract law. State government would be tasked with all
other matters.
Such an alternative tax system would provide fairness by offering citizens
a choice. The current income tax system, by contrast, leaves individuals
with no choice to reduce confiscation of wealth, short of forgoing income.
This alternative tax solution would allow an individual the election of
lawfully avoiding the sales tax by simply not purchasing an item. The
federal and state governments could also stimulate prosperity under this
system by, for example, exempting capital goods such as factory equipment
or farm machinery from the sales tax. Hence, individuals with means would
have an incentive to reinvest earnings, thus creating prosperity and jobs for
others rather than paying sales tax on consumable goods.
168. Romans 13:6-8 (New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition).
169. George, supra note 149, at 1642 (explaining that Aquinas acknowledges that an
unjust law is still a law for juristic analysis).
170. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5.
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Simplicity and equity would be natural outcomes of shifting the state’s
revenue stream towards a sales tax system. Individuals would not need to
file annual tax returns since there would be no income tax. Businesses
would only need to submit forms outlining the sales tax they have collected
on behalf of the government. Accusations of “tax loopholes” and the like
would be meaningless. An entire level of bureaucracy would be all but
eliminated.
The notion of responsible government would be restored since the
government would be responsible to explain all parts of the sales tax to its
citizens. The Federal Reserve would no longer be able to finance reckless
government spending because its power to issue currency would be
rescinded. With less income to misallocate, government waste on
inefficiencies would also be greatly reduced. Finally, and most importantly,
the formation of an accountable, limited government would restore
Americans’ unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
B. Sanctioning Constitutional Challenges
The sanctions and restrictions on Schiff’s speech are legal issues meriting
entirely separate articles. In brief, both the Supreme Court and lower courts
have dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of the income tax and
repeatedly sanctioned Schiff for his appeals.171 The district court dubbed
Schiff an “extremist” whose views make for unqualified constitutional
interpretations:
[T]he Second Circuit described Schiff as “an extremist who
reserve[s] the right to interpret the decisions of the Supreme
Court as he read[s] them from his layman's point of view
regardless of and oblivious to the interpretations of the
judiciary.”172
The judiciary did not merely sanction Schiff for his appeals, but also limited
his free speech by restricting the commercial sale of his book, The Federal
Mafia. In United States v. Schiff, the court held that Schiff’s book, The
Federal Mafia, was not protected by the First Amendment.173 Pursuant to 26
U.S.C.A. § 7408, the government sought an injunction proscribing the
171. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (D. Nev. 2003) ( “Schiff's
contention that the imposition of a validly enacted income tax by Congress violates the
taxing clauses of the Constitution has been rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.”).
172. Id. at 1269 (quoting Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1990)).
173. Id. at 1276-77.
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promoters, organizers, and marketers of Schiff’s book from engaging in its
commercial sale.174 The court reasoned that Schiff crossed the line from
permissible to impermissible speech by promoting fraudulent activities.175
In his defense, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) argued that a
ban on the book constituted an “impermissible prior restraint.”176 The
ACLU provided three reasons why The Federal Mafia cannot be classified
commercial speech:
(1) it does not fit the definition of commercial speech as
proposing no more than a commercial transaction; (2) it is sold
in bookstores and through the Internet independent of the tax
scheme; and (3) it is not promoted through paid memberships
involving face-to-face communication.177
The ACLU essentially argued that the court ought to apply the “more
stringent Brandenburg incitement standard before subjecting the book to
the preliminary injunction.”178 The court rejected each argument.
Central to the ACLU’s case was the claim that Schiff’s speech was not
commercial but political.179 The ACLU argued that Schiff’s book contained
“autobiographical and political expression” and therefore “[did] no more
than propose a commercial transaction.”180 The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that since the book instructs customers on the specifics
of filing zero income returns, the injunction was rightly applicable to
matters beyond mere advertisement: “The tax scheme's promotions identify
the book as the starting point of the program, and represent that [i]t shows
you how to file the zero return, stop your wage withholding, and explains
the basics.”181
The ACLU further contended that The Federal Mafia, marketed through
Freedom Books and online, was not a “direct part of the [zero income]
scheme.”182 Since the book was “sold independently in bookstores or
online,” it was not directly related to the marketing of the scheme.183 The
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court rejected this claim too, noting that the book was the starting point for
the scheme.184 Of central concern to the court was the inclusion of a “howto” manual in the book itself.185 Since the book provided actual samples of
zero returns, the court declared that the samples shifted the material from
protected to unprotected. The First Amendment, by this particular court’s
view, did not protect work that promoted illegal activity by providing
instructions on its actualization:
Far from containing merely commentary, information and
expression of opinion regarding the legitimacy of the tax system,
the book is, in part, a how-to manual directed to specific
individuals seeking instructions, sample forms, and attachable
affidavits to be used in the filing of false income tax returns and
submission of false W–4s.186
The line between permissible expression of opinion and impermissible
instruction, however, has not yet been clearly demarcated. Would the mere
exclusion of the “how-to” manual have afforded Schiff protection? Perhaps
so, but are not many forms of expression also an instruction in some
fashion? At what point does expression become instruction? Suffice it to
say, such questions have certainly not vanished with Schiff’s passing.187
Indeed, Mr. Irwin A. Schiff’s story will continue to ignite contentious
debate. The spirited grandfather of the tax protester movement struck the
core of the American psyche. As long as the current form of the income tax
is around, Americans will continue to echo Shylock in asking what value
there is in life if the fruit of one’s labor is continually plundered.
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